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Abstract: 
 
We show how a large country’s entrance on world markets can lead to lower and less quality 
diversity available to consumers rather than more.  In our model, autarky quality is directly 
proportional to the willingness to pay for quality and home market size, and inversely 
proportional to the cost of quality.  We formalize strategically interacting firms, and identify 
the context in which a low-quality producer can lead, driving high-quality producers out of 
the market despite the existence of customers willing to pay for higher quality. We discuss the 
feasibility of this ‘predatory strategy’ by an emerging country.  It is more likely in contexts 
where the emerging exporter is much larger.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Jaguars, Porsches, BMWs…, in 2012 about eleven percent of the new vehicles sold in the 
USA were luxury cars like these.  They were bought by people willing and able to pay for 
high quality goods.  Other people purchased less expensive vehicles produced by other auto 
makers.  The fact that some producers specialize in serving high-end customers while others 
specialize in supplying low-priced goods has been rationalized by industrial organization and 
international trade theorists for some time. Recently, however, a new pattern has emerged. In 
some retail markets, despite the existence of customers willing to pay for quality, luxury 
goods are no longer available.  Although the full spectrum of vertically-differentiated goods 
was available in the recent past, now only low-quality versions are offered.  In this paper we 
attempt to explain why a market may become dominated by only low-price, low-quality 
goods despite no reduction in the number of consumers willing to pay for high quality. 
 
Over three decades of literature exists concerning world markets for vertically-differentiated 
goods, also known as intra-industry trade.  A large part of this literature is based on industrial 
organization, e.g.: Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Motta (1993), 
Crampes and Hollander (1995), and Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2011).  
 
A canonical model by Motta, Thisse  and Cabrales (1997) consists of two firms in two 
countries, each producing a good identified by a quality index, strategically competing for a 
share of the global market in a two-stage game.  Consumers are characterized by their tastes 
and their willingness to pay for quality.  Quality is costly to produce.  In the first stage firms 
simultaneously choose the quality to supply.  In the second stage they compete in a non-
cooperative Cournot or Bertrand game.   In autarky, the quality choice that maximises profits 
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depends on the home market size and consumers’ willingness to pay for quality relative to the 
costs of supplying quality.  
 
The literature provides three main implications about what happens when countries open to 
trade. One, both firms respond to market incentives to change the quality they supply on the 
global market.  Two, in equilibrium the two firms never chose to supply the same quality, as 
that would drive both firms’ profits to zero.   Three, there are multiple stable equilibria. It is 
not possible to predict whether the firm in the country that has the lower quality in autarky 
will continue to supply low quality globally, or if it will “leapfrog” to supply the high quality 
product, or vice-versa.  These results are consistent with the industrial organisation literature.  
 
Motta, Thisse and Cabrales (1997) assume that the willingness to pay for high quality differs 
between the countries and that changing quality requires incurring fixed costs.  This is why 
the countries specialize in a different quality good in autarky.  When the countries open to 
trade, intra-industry two-way trade occurs, allowing high quality-loving consumers in both 
countries to obtain high quality goods, and low price customers in both countries to obtain 
low price goods.  Free trade thus leads to more quality diversity in local markets, not less. 
And “leapfrogging” on the supply side occurs only if the difference between the two 
countries’ willingness to pay for high quality is sufficiently small. 
 
The importance of domestic demand conditions in determining the patterns of international 
trade has been recognized since Linder (1961). Linder hypothesized that suppliers tailor their 
products to the tastes of domestic purchasers.  To the extent that the mix of tastes elsewhere 
are similar, there will be intra-industry trade with other regions.  Krugman (1980) highlighted 
the “home market size effect” in a monopolistically competitive context.  Porter (1991) 
emphasized the importance of domestic demand for high quality to prepare firms to compete 
in international markets. 
 
The ability to produce high quality goods has been noted as a condition for export success and 
economic development (Kremer 1993, Grossman and Helpman, 1991).  This could be 
understood as a prescription for leapfrogging.  In contrast, China has become a major exporter 
to global markets in many product lines without switching to high quality.  Husted and 
Nishioka (2012) report that initial Chinese exports were labor-intensive, low quality 
manufactured items such as clothing, footwear, and toys.  According to Berger and Martin 
(2011) the value of Chinese exports more than quadrupled in the eight years between 2000 
and 2007.  By 2009, China had become the world’s largest global exporter.   The entrance of 
China as a low-cost, low-quality supplier in world markets drove the domestic production of 
low price, low quality goods out of some countries’ economies.  But no-one expected it to 
drive high price, high quality goods out of both production and markets as well. 
 
In sum, the existing international trade and industrial organization theories indicate that as 
long as consumers have differentiated tastes and willingness to pay for quality, firms have 
incentives to differentiate supplies to satisfy global market demands.  The implication that 
free trade leads to greater quality diversity in each local market is also a consequence of the 
assumption that firms play a non-cooperative game in two stages, with simultaneous decision 
making at each stage.  But the relative sizes of trading countries today casts doubt on this 
simultaneous play assumption.  In a world where firms in some countries face huge domestic 
markets, it may be more realistic to assume that such firms assert their ability to lead, forcing 
smaller country rivals to follow their (quality, price) offer.  For example, why should a 
Chinese firm engage in a non-cooperative simultaneous game on a level-playing field when it 
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exports to the Australian market? Given a Chinese firm’s huge domestic market, large 
economies of scale and low unit production costs, why wouldn’t a Chinese firm behave as a 
leader, forcing the Australian firm to adapt its strategy in response? 
 
This is what we analyze in this paper.  We propose a model consisting of two countries, one 
small but implicitly rich, with a share of consumers willing to pay for higher quality, as well 
as higher labor costs and lower fixed costs for producing high quality goods.  The other 
country is very large, has low labor costs, low willingness to pay for quality, and a high fixed 
cost to produce high quality goods.  Giving these assumptions, in autarky the large country 
firm produces a lower quality than the small, rich country firm.  The difference in home 
market size is the first essential difference between our model and the existing literature.     
 
The second essential difference is justified by the first assumption about relative size.  
Because of the low-quality producing country’s large home market size, it can credibly lead.  
We formalize a Stackelberg-like game.  We show that a large country can choose the quality 
and quantity that forces the small country firm to exit the market.  Our model thus rationalizes 
how a low quality product supplied by a large country can capture an entire market.  
 
We analyze the feasibility of this aggressive predatory strategy, demonstrates that it 
maximizes profit, and investigate the stability of the equilibria of the game.  We show that the 
autarkic characteristics of the large country are primordial.  A large domestic market is 
essential. Even if countries have the same cost characteristics and face the same willingness to 
pay for quality, only a sufficiently large country’s firm can successfully follow a predatory 
strategy.   If the domestic market is large enough, the low quality-producing country can 
export its autarky quality, wholly avoiding the costs of adapting quality to compete for just a 
share of the other country’s market. This contrasts with the existing finding in the literature 
that firms always have incentives to adapt the quality of their supplies to the global market 
when they open to trade.   Furthermore, when the small country/high quality producing firm 
raises its quality in an attempt to relax the competition on its own market, it’s global market 
revenue is not sufficient to cover costs.  High quality production shuts down. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the model and the autarky 
situation.  Section 3 formalizes the open market situation. Assuming the large country leads, 
we formalize a Stackelberg game in section 4, focusing on the (quality, quantity) strategy that 
nullifies the profits of the high quality producer, which we call a predatory strategy.  We 
analyze the feasibility conditions for the predatory strategy in section 5, emphasizing the 
implications of relative size.  In section 6 we compare the profitability of the predatory 
strategy to the profitability of the equilibria in the non-cooperative simultaneous game.  The 
last section concludes. 
 
2. The model and the autarky situation 
 
We model two countries, H (“Home”) and F (“Foreign”).  In country j (j=H,F), consumers 
indexed by a taste for quality θ  are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, bj] with density 
Sj.  On the supply side, firms incur a quadratic production cost 2jjj qcC =  and a fixed cost juK  
that is quadratic in quality: 2jjju ukK = . Thus in autarky, in each country j, a monopoly firm 
produces a single quality uj of a good. 
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Consumers either buy one unit or none at all.  Consumers of type θ  will buy one unit only if 
their net consumer surplus is positive, that is, only if θ uj -pj 0≥ , where pj  is the price of the 
good of quality uj.  When only one quality ujA is available, consumers with θ  higher than 
JAθˆ =
jA
jA
u
p
 buy one unit of the good.  In autarky, market demand in each country is thus: 
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
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bSD ,    j= H,F. 
 
In sum, there are four differences between the two countries: 
 
1) the willingness to pay for quality is lower in Foreign than in Home HF bb < . 
 
2) Foreign is larger: HHFF bSbS > ,  in contrast with the exiting literature, e.g.,  Motta, et al., 
(1997).  We normalize 1=HS .  
 
3) it follows that the marginal cost of production, cj , is lower in F than H.  Normalizing that 
cost to zero implies 0  ,0 >= HF CC  .  
 
4) the fixed cost to produce a different quality is lower in Home: FH kk <<0 .   
 
These four assumptions describe country H as a relatively small developed country, with 
higher wages, more sophisticated consumers, and lower product line switching costs (due to, 
for example, pre-existing R&D or more flexible or productive infrastructure).  Meanwhile, 
country F is a big emerging country, with a relative abundance of labour and thus lower 
wages, as well as a large population of subsistence consumers. 
 
Given the fixed cost of quality, to maximize profits firms will produce only one quality.  
Profits are given by: 
jujjA
j
jAjA
jAjjA KCqS
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Maximizing jApi  with respect to jAq  and jAu  we find that: 
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Given 0=Fc  the autarky quality choice (1) by F simplifies to: 
        .
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Clearly, F’s profit-maximizing quality is increasing in S and b, and decreasing in k, the fixed 
cost of quality  This implication contrasts with the usual explanation that emerging economies 
export low quality goods strictly because their labour is low-priced.   Producing lower quality 
goods is also a rational outcome where domestic consumers have a low willingness to pay for 
quality, the country is relatively small, and the fixed costs of higher quality are high.
 
Finally, recall that consumers with θ  higher than JAθˆ =
jA
jA
u
p
 will buy one unit of a good.  Thus 
for a given population, the firm in the country where consumers have a higher willingness to 
pay for quality produces a higher quality, sold at a higher price.  This is a another significant 
implication of asymmetric home market size.  When there is a difference in the number of 
consumers in each quality range (density Sj) abstracting from any differences in consumers’ 
willingness to pay for quality (b) nor difference in the fixed cost of quality (K, or k), the 
autarky quality produced by the firm in the larger country will be higher. 
 
Thus, to formalize the situation in which the larger country produces the lower quality product 
in autarky,  we use (1) and (2) to obtain the conditions on SF  relative to bj, cH, and kj such that 
in autarky, F produces a lower quality than H: 
               2
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For the remainder of this paper, we assume parameters values consistent with this condition. 
 
 
3. Free Trade 
 
When the two countries open to trade, both low and high quality versions may be available to 
consumers in each country.  In each country j the consumer indifferent between buying the 
higher or the lower quality is indexed by: 
FH
FH
j
uu
pp
−
−
=θ~  
 
Thus in each country, the domestic demand for the higher quality (overscored D) is: 
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While demand for the lower quality (underscored D) is: 
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When free trade is possible, each firm faces a new set of demands due to the different 
willingness to pay for quality because FH bb ≠ , and, a different number of consumers at each 
willingness to pay because FH SS ≠ . 
 
The firms may have incentives to adjust quality to supply the global market.   But to do so 
they must pay a fixed cost to change quality.  Some authors assume that this adjustment cost 
depends on the difference between the autarky and open market quality. Unfortunately with 
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this assumption, as Motta, et al, 1997 explain, it is impossible to find analytical results for the 
equilibria of the game; numerical simulation is required.   In models where it is assumed that 
firms have constant marginal costs, e.g., Venables (1990) and Motta et al (1997), firms 
segment the market in prices, then maximize the global profit by choosing to supply one 
quality to both markets.   Others, following Brander and Krugman (1983), assume that firms 
choose prices to maximize profits separately on both markets, which can lead to reciprocal 
dumping. 
 
In order to focus on quality choice we rule out dumping. And our assumption that production 
costs are quadratic rules out segmenting the market in prices.  Because of the fixed cost of 
quality, firms choose to supply a single quality on both market places. They also choose the 
quantity to produce that maximizes their global profit. 
 
From (4), the global market demand for high quality products facing the H firm is given by: 
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given SH normalized to 1, and assuming both qualities are available in both markets.  
Similarly, from (5), the global market demand for low quality products facing the F firm is: 
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The corresponding free trade prices when both versions of the good are transacted are thus: 
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Recall that demand for the high quality good in country F is positive only if 
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Given (8) and (9), we obtain that )1(
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−
=θ  , and the necessary 
condition for positive demand for the high quality good in country F is HFH qbb <− .  
 
It follows that there is difference in the willingness to pay for quality at which two-way trade 
will not occur, that is, although H may import low quality versions from F, it will not export 
high-quality versions to F.  In the following we assume parameter values consistent with 
positive demand for high quality goods among country F consumers, i.e., two-way trade. 
 
 
4. The Predatory Strategy 
 
Our objective in this paper is to understand how high quality goods could disappear from a 
developed country’s marketplace.  We know that this outcome is not rationalized by assuming 
a situation in which firms play a two-stage non-cooperative game, as in the existing literature.  
As we shall show, the observed outcome is rationalized if we assume that the larger country 
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behaves as a Stackelberg leader, to achieve a predatory objective.  Taking into account the 
small country firm’s best response, the firm in F commits to supply the quality and quantity 
on the global market such that when the small country firm adapts quality, its profits are non-
positive, resulting in the ultimate closure of the H-firm.   
 
The game we formalize proceeds in two stages.  Similar to the Stackelberg game, anticipating 
the H-firm’s best response, the F-firm commits to supply the quality and quantity that should 
nullify the H-firm’s profits.  In the second stage, the H-firm chooses the new quality and 
quantity that maximizes their profit.  As usual, this game is solved by backward induction.   
 
First solve the profit maximization problem of the H-firm, as anticipated by the F-firm.  
Assuming that the H-firm will adapt quality2 ( HAH uu ≠ ), H-firm profit is: 
2))(( HHHHHHH ukqqcp −−=pi  
With free trade and both goods consumed in both countries, the open market price pH is given 
by (8).  Rearranging, profit is: 
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The H-firm is assumed to choose the quality Hu  and quantity Hq  that maximize Hpi .  The 
first order conditions with respect to Hu imply that: 
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Expressing Hpi  in terms of this expression for uH we have: 
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The H–firm also chooses the production quantity that maximizes its profit.  Let HF qq λ=  
( 0>λ ). The first order condition with respect to the profit maximizing quantity is: 
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Of the three solutions for Hq , the one consistent with a negative second derivative is: ( ))1(16)1(32233
4
1 2222
FFHFHHFFFFHHFFHH SukSckSbSbbbSbbq ++++++−+= λ    (13) 
                                                 
2
 Analyses of this game assuming Home does not adapt results in theoretical open market outcomes inconsistent 
with the observed outcome we seek to explain: (i) for (bH - bF) too large, Home serves the domestic market only, 
but free trade still leads to wider quality choice  in Home; (ii) at lower (bH - bF), there is a threshold SF  at which 
Home also serves only the domestic market, and (iii) at larger SF, there is leapfrogging, also leading to higher 
quality in the open market than in autarky.   Details available from the authors on request. 
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Equations (11) and (13) express the H-firm’s profit-maximizing response in terms of the 
quality Fu  and quantity Fq choice variables of the F-firm  (and the relevant parameters).  
Note that one obtains the same results by first maximizing Hpi  with respect to Hq . 
 
Now, solve the “predatory strategy” problem of the F firm.  What pair ),( FF uq  nullifies Hpi ?    
 
Denote HF qq λ= and express the value function for Hpi  in terms of Hq  as given by(13).   
This results in an expression for Hpi  in terms of the parameters ( ),,, jHjF kcbS as well 
as λ and F’s choice of Fu .  Find the value of λ that nullifies the H-firm’s profit by equating 
Hpi ( FjHjF ukcbS ,,,,, λ ) to 0: 
2222
2
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With this value of λ  in (13), the expression for Hq  is: 
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In sum, this is a game in which the F-firm is able to drive the H-firm profits (12) to zero by 
offering Fq Fu = G.  A numerical example is given in Appendix 1.   Clearly, when the F-firm 
offers the (qF , uF) such that Fq Fu = G + eps,  the H-firm’s revenues will not cover costs, and 
it will be driven out of  the market. 
 
5. The feasibility conditions for a predatory strategy 
 
The predatory strategy by the firm in F is to set Fq . Fu = G   (14).   Under what parametric 
conditions can the F-firm successfully implement this strategy while producing the lower 
quality version of the good?  If the F-firm adapts quality ( FAF uu ≠ ), given our normalizations 
its profit is 2)( FFFFF ukqp −=pi .  Using (9) to express the open market price of the low 
quality good, we have: 
( ) 2
1 FFF
FFHFFH
FF ukS
uqqbSb
q −

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


+
−−+
=pi    (15) 
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Alternatively, if the F-firm simply specializes in and exports its autarky quality, then it avoids 
the cost of adapting quality: 
   
( )


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


+
−−+
=
F
FAFHFFH
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q
1
pi     (15’) 
 
First alternative: Foreign firm exports its autarky quality 
 
Proposition  1: 
 
The emergent countries able to play a predatory strategy by exporting their autarky quality  
must have a high density of population. The density of the population must be  higher when 
the rich country consumers’ willingness to pay for quality is higher. 
 
The F-firm can drive the H-firm out of the market by proposing a pair Guq FF =  where G 
depends on the characteristics of the countries (14). The higher is the willingness to pay for 
quality in the rich country (the higher is Hb ) and the lower is the cost of production in the rich 
country (the lower is cH), the larger is G, and the more difficult it is for an F-firm to 
successfully follow a predatory strategy. 
 
When the F firm exports its autarky quality when it behaves as a leader when it opens to 
trade, it is constrained by the trade-off formalized in (14).  The lower its autarky quality, FAu ,  
the higher quantity, Fq , must be to conform with Guq FAF = .  Nevertheless, its production 
cannot exceed the global market size: 
)( HFFHMaxF qbSbq −+=           (16)  
In consequence, the minimum autarky quality in country F consistent with a predatory 
strategy is:  
min )( HFFHFA qbSb
G
u
−+
=       (17) 
From (2) we have that 
F
FF
FA k
bS
u
8
2
= .  This allows us to express the market density, SF ,  
necessary for a successful predatory strategy by the F firm exporting its autarky quality.  By 
successful predatory strategy, we mean =Hpi 0  (10), and that the F-firm’s profits (15’) are 
higher than under any other strategy.  It follows from (17) and (2) that in order for the F firm 
to play the predatory strategy, F must be sufficiently large, i.e., it must be that: 
>FS )(
)8(
2
HFFHF
F
qbSbb
kG
−+
.            (18) 
 
We illustrate via simulation how the minimum predator size (or density), FS  , varies as jb , 
Hc  and jk  vary in Figure 1.  Consider 3=Fb , 5=Hb , 3=Hc , 8.0=Fk  and 3.0=Hk .   
These values of the parameters are consistent with (3).  Figure 1 illustrates the feasibility of 
the predatory strategy when the F- firm exports its autarky quality at different levels of SF 
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 uF                   
  
Figure 1. Autarky quality in Foreign, uFA, compared to the minimum quality choice required 
for a successful predatory strategy (Min uFA) with respect to Foreign size SF,  assuming bH = 
5, bF = 3, cH = 3, kF = 0.8, kH = 0.3.  
 
The steeper (red) line in Figure 1 illustrates that Foreign autarky quality is directly 
proportional to its size, as explained in the second section of this paper.  The shallower line 
(blue) represents how the minimum quality consistent with an implementable predatory 
strategy summarized by Guq FAF =  varies with respect to FS . On and under the shallower 
line, ≤Fpi 0. With the illustrated parameter values, the F-firm will not behave as a predator 
exporting its autarky quality when it is small, up to 4.2≤FS . At larger size, Foreign’s 
autarky quality (2) exceeds the minimum quality that satisfies (17)  for a successful predatory 
strategy.   This underscores our finding that the emerging country must be sufficiently large 
(about three times larger, depending on the other parameters) to implement the predatory 
strategy.  
 
The main result is that among emergent countries that have the same cost of quality, cost of 
production, and their own consumers’ willingness to pay for quality, only the large emergent 
countries-- with sufficiently high FS --  are able to implement a profit-maximizing predatory 
strategy while exporting their autarky quality. 
 
Alternatively, when rich country consumers are willing to pay even more for quality (higher 
values of Hb ), the minimum quality of exports from the emergent country ( FAumin ) for a 
successful predatory strategy must also be higher.  
 
Furthermore, the higher is the willingness to pay for quality in the rich country, Hb , relative 
to bF , the larger the emergent country must be for it to succeed with a predatory strategy.  
This is illustrated by comparing Figures 2 and 1. Figure 2 is generated using the same 
parameters as Figure 1, except that Hb  = 7 in Figure 2.  Note also that (3) is satisfied through 
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14<FS .  Figure 2 shows the higher size of  F ( 5.4=FS ) consistent with a successful 
predatory strategy in F’s autarky quality when the difference in the willingness to pay for 
quality is larger. 
 
                uF 
 
Figure 2. Autarky quality in Foreign, uFA, compared to the minimum quality required for a 
successful predatory strategy (Min uFA) with respect to Foreign size SF;  assuming bH = 7 (all 
else the same as in Figure 1)   
 
Second alternative: the Foreign firm adapts quality to supply the global market 
 
Proposition  2: 
 
The emergent country playing a predatory strategy will chose to adapt quality to the new 
open market when differences between country willingness to pay for quality and in 
population are sufficiently small.  Nevertheless if differences in population are large, the 
emergent country firm can successfully corner the market while exporting its autarky quality. 
 
Let us consider now the alternative that the Foreign firm adapts and exports the quality 
FAF uu ≠  while satisfying Guq FF = .  In this case the Foreign firm incurs the fixed cost of 
quality, and Fpi is defined as in (15). 
 
Using the value of λ which nullifies the Home firm’s profit, the corresponding value of Hq  
(13’), and setting == HF qq λ 

	




Fu
G
 in (15), the value of Fpi  depends on the parameters 
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( ),,, jHjF kcbS and is only a function of Fu . We find the level of quality that maximizes the 
Foreign firm’s profit by satisfying the first order condition  0=
∂
∂
F
F
u
pi
.
3
 
For parameter values 3=Fb , 5=Hb , 3=Hc , 8.0=Fk  and 3.0=Hk , Figure 3 illustrates 
Foreign firm’s profit under the predatory strategy as a function of density FS , comparing 
“adapt quality” to the “don’t adapt quality” alternative. 
 
F 
 
Figure 3. F-firm profits under the predatory the “adapt quality” and “don’t adapt” alternatives 
with respect to density FS , given bH = 5, bF = 3, cH = 3, kF = 0.8, kH = 0.3.  
 
At low levels of FS  the Foreign firm maximises profit by adapting quality to the new open 
market (the red curve).  At larger FS  the Foreign firm maximises profit by exporting its 
autarky quality (s the blue curve).  Given the parameter values illustrated, the alternatives are 
equally profitable at FS =2.9. Above that size, exporting the autarky quality is more 
profitable.  Facing a large number of consumers with a low willingness to pay for quality in 
Foreign, the Foreign firm has insufficient incentives to incur a fixed cost of switching to 
higher quality to sell to the Home country consumers. 
 
Consider how this result varies with respect to bH. When the willingness to pay for quality in 
Home, Hb ,  is higher, it is more difficult for the Foreign firm to implement a successful 
predatory strategy.  But there is still a Foreign size at which the predatory strategy dominates. 
As shown in Figure 4, with Hb =7, values of other parameters being the same, the predatory 
strategy is not profitable at all for 2<FS .  For 2 < SF < 5.2, the Foreign firm has the incentive 
to adapt quality and serve more Home consumers.  The size effect dominates after SF > 5.2.   
Above that size the F-firm most profitably exports its autarky quality in a predatory strategy. 
 
                                                 
3
 Details of the calculations are available on request to the authors. 
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F 
 
Figure 4. Foreign firm profits under alternative predatory strategies (adapt, not adapt) with 
respect to SF , given parameters bH = 7, all else equal to Figure 3.  
 
In this section we have shown that a ‘predatory’ strategy model rationalizes the observed 
exclusively low quality goods on an open market following the entrance of a very large, 
relatively poorer country.  The size of the emergent country is key, as is the relative 
willingness to pay for high quality.  When the emergent country is small, as we shall show in 
the next section, its most profitable strategy is to play a non-cooperative game.  That results in 
the more diverse quality outcomes that have been common in the past on open markets.   
 
When the emergent country is more than thrice the size of its trade partner (depending on 
other parameters), it maximizes profit by implementing a predatory strategy in which it 
simply exports its autarky quality when it opens to trade.  The threshold size is increasing in 
the willingness to pay for quality in the Home country, but there is always a sufficiently large 
size at which the predatory strategy is the most profitable.  The best response to the predatory 
strategy in Home leaves the high quality firm with zero profit (or lower), ultimately driving it 
out of the marketplace.  The ultimate outcome is exclusively lower quality goods after the 
emergence, compared to before.  This is the outcome observed in some markets (e.g., 
clothing)  since China emerged on global markets. 
 
 
6. Comparison with the simultaneous non-cooperative Cournot Game 
 
In this section, for purposes of comparison we consider the situation where the monopoly 
firms in the two countries play a non-cooperative game when they open to trade, as in the 
existing literature (e.g., Motta, et al (1997)).   In the first stage they simultaneously choose 
qualities uH  and uF and in the second stage they compete in quantities qH and qF.  According 
to the existing literature, depending on the values of the parameters jb , jS , jc , and jk , there 
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may be multiple Nash equilibria, including “leapfrog” equilibria (where the low quality 
producer switches to a higher quality than the high-quality rival).  
 
Assuming both adapt quality to the open market, as in the existing literature, the firms’ profits 
are as usual, given by equations (10) and (15).  We solve by backwards induction.  First, find 
the production quantities that maximize their respective profits.  The first order condition 
solutions consistent with a negative second derivative are: 
 
)4)1(4(
)2)((
FHFH
FHFFH
H
uuSc
uubSb
q
−++
−+
=       and   )4)1(4(
))1(2)((
FHFH
HFHFFH
F
uuSc
uScbSb
q
−++
++++
=  
 
Substituting these expressions into Hpi  and Fpi we obtain: 
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2
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And    ( ) 22
22
)4)1(4)(1(
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
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
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+−+−+
+++
=pi      (20) 
 
At the first stage, the firms simultaneously choose the quality to supply to maximize these 
profit ‘functions.’  The first order condition solutions consistent with negative second 
derivatives are the Nash equilibria of the game.  
 
 
Compare the Foreign firm’s profits from a non-cooperative game strategy to its profit from 
the alternative predatory strategies. The analytical solutions are prohibitively difficult.  We 
can, however, identify superior strategies via simulation, assuming values for the parameters 
2 3 4 5 6
50
50
100
SF 

 
F  
   
 
Don’t adapt 
Adapt 
Figure 5: Foreign firm profits as a function of SF for both predatory strategy alternatives and the 
non cooperative strategy, 3=Fb , 5=Hb , 3=Hc , 8.0=Fk  and 3.0=Hk 
Non Coop 
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( 3=Fb , 5=Hb , 3=Hc , 8.0=Fk  and 3.0=Hk ), and investigate how the strategy rankings 
vary with respect to the parameters, especially the Foreign market size or density, SF.  
 
In Figure 5 the Foreign firm’s profit as a function of FS  from both alternative predatory 
strategies is compared to profits when it participates in a simultaneous non-cooperative game. 
 
Figure 5 shows that at low levels of FS  the Foreign firm maximises profit by playing the non-
cooperative game.  When its size or density FS  is larger than 1.9, the Foreign firm maximises 
profit with the predatory strategy alternative in which it adapts quality. At levels of FS  higher 
than FS =2.9, it is most profitable for the F-firm to implement the predatory strategy with a 
low autarky quality, as shown in the previous section. 
 
As seen, this threshold size is directly proportional to the difference in the willingness to pay 
for quality.  This is illustrated in Figure 6.  When Hb  is raised to 7, all else equal, the 
predatory strategy is not profitable below 2.5=FS . However, once again, even with a 
significant difference between the willingness to pay for high quality, the effect of that 
difference is ultimately overwhelmed by the difference in size.  In Figure 6 the size effect 
dominates after 2.5>FS . Above that size the F-firm can most profitably export its autarky 
quality in a predatory strategy. Note also that when Hb =7, the F-firm predatory strategy 
alternative “adapt” is dominated at all values of  FS . 
   
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper provides theoretical explanations for what has occurred in many developed 
countries since China emerged on global markets.  We have proven how a large country’s 
low-quality exports can dominate an entire market, not only where low-price, low-quality 
goods are demanded, but also where there is a number of consumers willing to pay for high 
quality.  We have shown how large can lead to less. 
 
Figure 6. Foreign firm profits with respect to SF under both predatory strategy alternatives and 
the non cooperative strategy; bF = 3, kH = 0.3, cH = 3, kF = 0.8, bH = 7. 
2 3 4 5 6
300
200
100
SF 
Non coop 
Adapt 
Don’t adapt 
F  
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China’s exports of low quality manufactured products such as clothing, footwear, and toys 
have been documented by Amiti and Freund (2010) and Husted and Nishioka (2012).  Our 
model shows that an emergent’s country quality is inversely proportional to the cost of quality 
and directly proportional to its size.  The finding augments the typical explanation that 
emerging economies export low quality goods strictly because their labour is low-priced.  
 
The importance of emergent country size,  Proposition 1,  helps explain why China has 
managed to dominate some markets while other low-labour cost countries have not.  
Proposition 2 clarifies how a very large emerging country’s lower quality exports can drive 
high-quality producers out of the market, despite the existence of customers willing to pay for 
higher quality.  These findings are unprecedented in the literature, but widely observed in 
open markets for some goods. We have shown how free trade can lead to less quality diversity 
rather than more.   
 
We have shown that a ‘predatory’ strategy model rationalizes the observed exclusively low 
quality goods on an open market following the entrance of a very large, relatively poorer 
country.  The size of the emergent country is key, as is the relative willingness to pay for high 
quality.  When the emergent country is not too much larger than its trade partner, we have 
shown that its most profitable strategy is to play a non-cooperative game (section 6).  Thus, 
when the countries opening to trade are relatively similar in size, the outcome to be expected 
is more quality diversity, including high quality, on the open market.  That outcome has 
occurred, especially in the past.   This also explains why the previous literature analyzed intra-
industry trade in vertically differentiated goods assuming similarly-sized countries a non-
cooperative game market structure.   
 
However, when the emergent country is very large, we have shown that it maximizes profit by 
implementing a predatory strategy in which it exports its autarky quality when it opens to 
trade.  The best response to the predatory strategy in the relatively smaller country can leave 
its high quality producers unable to cover costs, ultimately driving them out of the 
marketplace.  Again, the size of the emergent country’s domestic market is essential.  The size 
at which a predatory strategy can succeed is directly proportional to the trading partner’s 
willingness to pay for quality, but there is always a sufficiently large size at which the 
predatory strategy is most profitable for the emerging country.  The ultimate outcome is 
exclusively lower quality goods on the open market, compared to before its emergence.  This 
is the outcome observed in some markets (e.g., clothing)  since China emerged on global 
markets. 
 
While our analyses have provided plausible answers to these questions, we have also opened 
new lines of inquiry for future research.  As noted earlier, since 2009 China has been the 
world’s largest exporter.   It may be that no single set of assumptions about size, costs, 
preferences, and market structure can explain China’s success on global markets.  For 
example, in  “What’s So Special about China’s Exports?” Rodrik (2006) noted that although 
China exported relatively low quality goods twenty years ago,  more recently China has been 
exporting “goods that are three times more sophisticated than what would be normally 
expected for a country at its income level” (Rodrik, 2006).   It has dominated in markets for 
high-tech goods such as cell phones, liquid crystal displays, integrated electronic circuits,  and 
laptop computers.   In fact, by 2009, China supplied 85 percent of the imported laptops on the 
US market (Berger and Martin, 2011).  Meanwhile there has been an explosion in Chinese 
demand for these products as well.    
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Our model provides a point of departure for future research in a few ways.  One,  domestic 
market size can be even more important than costs or wages, i.e., incomes, in explaining the 
quality of goods exported by emerging countries.  This is empirically testable.  Two, the 
lower are the costs of switching to higher quality, the more likely is leapfrogging.  This is the 
case in China today with respect to high tech production.   Three, in this paper we have 
abstracted from leapfrogging, because when emerging countries leapfrog the outcome is more 
quality, not less, which is not the outcome we have sought to explain.   We already know that 
leapfrogging is more likely the more similar are the trading partners with respect to 
willingness to pay for quality.  Clearly it could be interesting to analyze the outcomes of our 
predatory model allowing for leapfrogging and alternative quality switching costs.   
 
 
Appendix I.  Example of a Successful Predatory Strategy  
 
As an example, consider 5=Hb , 3=Fb , 3.0=Hk , 8.0=Fk , 3=Hc  and 3=FS . 
With these values of the parameters we can see from (1) and (2) that in autarky, the Home 
firm produces high quality and the Foreign firm produces the lower quality: 
 
8488.9=HAu  and  3709.30=HAP          ;      .218.4=FAu and 328.6=FAP  
Note that the Foreign firm is able to serve half of its market when the Home firm offers 
916.1=HAq  
 
If  the Foreign firm offers a global quantity and a quality such than Fq . Fu = G  (see(14)), 
then the best response of the Home firm is to offer a different (higher) quality and the quantity 
that maximizes its profit, given by equations (11) and (13).  
 
Putting these optimal values in (10) with  Fq . Fu = G , we obtain  Hpi =0.  
 
What happens to the Home firm ?  It is able to offer, according to (11) , (13) and (8), a  
quantity 932.2=Hq  and quality 521.13=Hu , at the price 502.27=Hp .  Note that Home 
firm has raised the quality and decreased the price of its good (relative to autarky) in response 
to competition from the Foreign firm. 
 
The quantities that the Home firm could offer on each market (see (6)) are 
233.2=





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−
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(Note that using (8) and (9), we obtain )1(
~
F
FFHH
FH
FH
S
bSqb
uu
pp
+
+−
=
−
−
=θ  so we do not need to 
know Fp  and Fu  to obtain these results). 
 
The corresponding revenues from each market are 412.61=HHR  and 223.19=HFR  
However, having chosen to adapt quality, the Home firm must pay the fixed cost ( 2HH uk  
=54.845) as well as production costs ( 79.252 =HH qc ).  The resulting profit Hpi = 0. 
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